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We study the role of firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in executive compensation. We decompose
the variation in executive compensation and find that time invariant firm and especially manager fixed
effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay. We then show that in many settings, it
is important to include fixed effects to mitigate potential omitted variable bias. Furthermore, we find
that compensation fixed effects are significantly correlated with management styles (i.e., manager
fixed effects in corporate policies). Finally, the method used in the paper has a number of potential
applications in financial economics.
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Executive compensation is of considerable interest to the business and academic communities, 
as well as to policymakers. The existing literature documents that observable firm 
characteristics (e.g., firm size and performance) and managerial characteristics (e.g., job tenure 
and gender) partially explain the variation in executive pay. However, little is known about the 
impact on compensation from unobservable firm and managerial characteristics, such as latent 
managerial skills.
1 In this paper, we study the direct influence of firm and manager fixed 
effects on executive compensation, as well as how the inclusion of fixed effects impacts the 
interpretation and contribution of traditional explanatory variables. 
In terms of the direct influence of fixed effects, it is well known that observationally 
equivalent individuals often earn markedly different levels of compensation. This could occur 
because of unobservable firm characteristics, such as corporate culture, or it could be due to 
unobserved personal characteristics, such as innate ability or personality. This suggests that it 
is important to directly examine whether unobservable firm and manager characteristics could 
explain a significant portion of the variation in executive compensation.
2 In terms of the 
impact on the significance and interpretation of other explanatory variables, to the extent that 
excluded person or firm effects are correlated with observable characteristics, empirical 
analysis of the latter could produce biased coefficient estimates. For example, highly skilled 
managers are more likely to be paid higher wages; such managers could also tend to work in 
                                                 
1 Consistent with the statistics and economics literatures, we use the word “unobservable” to indicate information 
that is difficult to quantify or unavailable to the econometrician—hence it is “unobservable” from the perspective 
of the econometrician. We do not exclude the possibility that such “unobservable” information may be observed 
by other parties such as employers. 
2 As discussed later, we use fixed effects to capture the time-invariant dimension of unobserved heterogeneity. It 
is possible that some unobserved heterogeneities can change over time; the fixed effects model cannot capture 
such time-variant unobserved heterogeneity. 
  1larger firms. In models that do not account for manager fixed effects, the estimated effect of 
firm size on executive pay could be inflated.  
                                                
  Several approaches could be used to address the primary goal of this paper, which is to 
investigate the role of unobservable time-invariant firm and manager heterogeneities (or, 
loosely speaking, firm and manager fixed effects) in determining executive pay.
3 The simplest 
approach combines firm and manager fixed effects by including a dummy variable for each 
unique firm-manager combination (which is called a “spell”) in the full universe of 
compensation data. This “spell fixed effects” approach controls for the combined influence of 
firm and manager fixed effects, and mitigates possible concerns about estimation bias. 
However, the spell approach does not separately identify firm and manager fixed effects and 
thus does not reveal their relative importance. Therefore, the spell approach is not adequate to 
address an additional goal of our paper, which is to isolate and quantify how much of the 
variation in executive pay is attributable to observable time variant firm effects (e.g., firm size, 
market to book ratio, firm performance), observable time variant manager effects (e.g., job 
tenure), time invariant firm fixed effects, time invariant manager fixed effects, and year effects.  
One way to separately identify these various effects is to study a panel of compensation 
data composed only of managers who have changed firms and to include manager, firm, and 
year dummies in the specification. For example, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) use this approach 
to study how manager fixed effects are related to various corporate activities. We refer to the 
approach of studying a sample of managers who have changed firms as the MDV (mover 
dummy variable) method. The sample that can be studied using the MDV approach, however, 
 
3 Time-invariant or slow moving manager heterogeneity, such as latent managerial ability, will be captured by 
manager fixed effects. For example, Abowd et al. (1999, 2003) and Iranzo et al. (2008) use person fixed effects to 
proxy for employee human capital. However, it is also possible that managers may develop their abilities over 
time. We attempt to capture time changing managerial ability by including job tenure in our empirical 
specifications.  
  2is necessarily small due to the relatively small number of executive job changes in most 
samples. Because of this limitation, we introduce to the finance literature an alternative method 
to estimate manager and firm fixed effects separately. This alternative method is based on 
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999; AKM henceforth). The AKM method can lever the 
potentially small number of mover observations (i.e., managers who move across companies) 
to deduce information about non-movers who work in firms that have employed at least one 
mover. This allows us to separate firm and manager fixed effects not only for movers but also 
for some non-movers, increasing the sample size and power. 
The key economic implications from our paper are similar regardless of whether we use 
the spell method, the MDV method or the AKM method. We consistently find that firm and 
manager fixed effects explain a significant proportion of the variation in executive 
compensation. When separating manager fixed effects from firm fixed effects using either the 
MDV or the AKM method, we find that manager fixed effects are more important than firm 
fixed effects in explaining the level of executive pay. We also demonstrate that ignoring fixed 
effects could yield biased coefficient estimates for other variables. For example, we find that 
the magnitude of the firm size coefficient decreases by approximately 40% when manager 
fixed effects are included in the specification. Our results suggest that in many settings it may 
be important to control for manager and firm fixed effects to mitigate missing variable bias.
4   
We also link our estimates of manager fixed compensation effects to management 
“styles” in corporate policies. We study whether managers with different styles or traits are 
remunerated accordingly. According to Bertrand and Schoar (2003), managers vary in style 
                                                 
4 Our analysis does not imply that every empirical specification should include firm and manager fixed effects. 
The decision of whether or not to employ a fixed effects model is predicated on the goal of the research. It is 
worth noting that the fixed effects model is not without limitations. We discuss caveats and interpretation issues in 
detail at the end of Section 4.1.3. 
  3and differ in the aggressiveness of their investment and financing choices. Our finding that 
links policy fixed effects and compensation fixed effects indicates that more aggressive 
managers appear to be remunerated for the additional risk they take.    
The primary contributions of this paper are threefold. First, the paper adds to the 
executive compensation literature by providing the first empirical study of the role of 
unobserved firm and managerial heterogeneities in determining executive pay. The literature 
on executive compensation (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999, Core, Guay, and Larcker, 
2008, Frydman and Saks, 2010, Gabaix and Landier, 2008, Rose and Shepard, 1997, among 
others) has focused on how observable firm and manager characteristics affect the level of pay. 
Many of these studies do not include any fixed effects, some include firm fixed effects, very 
few include manager fixed effects, and none include both.
5 Given the importance of latent 
factors such as innate ability, preferences, risk aversion, personality, firm culture, etc. in 
shaping corporate outcomes, we view incorporating both firm and manager heterogeneities into 
the determinants of executive pay as a significant step. When quantifying the explanatory 
power of the time-invariant dimension of these heterogeneities, our results suggest that firm 
fixed effects and particularly manager fixed effects are important factors in explaining 
executive pay.  
Second, to the extent that the omitted relevant variables are time invariant, including 
both firm and manager fixed effects produces estimated parameters on observable firm and 
managerial characteristics that are less likely to be contaminated by omitted variable bias. Most 
prior research focuses on the observed characteristics in order to address particular theories. 
                                                 
5 When regressing the level of executive pay on explanatory variables, some papers control for firm fixed effects 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009, Frydman and Saks, 2010, Gabaix and 
Landier, 2008, Hubbard and Palia, 1995, Joskow et al., 1996, Kraft and Niederprum, 1999, Perry and Zenner, 
2001), a few papers control for manager fixed effects (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999, Garvey and Milbourn, 2003, 
Perry and Zenner, 2001), and none control for both at the same time. All these prior studies focus on observable 
determinants. 
  4We point out that to interpret the evidence in the context of theories, it is important to control 
for fixed effects if doing so helps mitigate potential omitted variable bias. For example, the 
significant relation between firm size and pay is well established in executive compensation. 
We show that the effect of firm size on executive pay level is likely overstated if the omitted 
variables are not properly controlled. Our paper also documents the economic effects of 
manager fixed effects by showing that they are significantly related to corporate policies. 
Our third contribution is the introduction of the AKM method into finance, in the 
context of the growing attention being paid to manager-specific effects. Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003) examine managerial fixed effects in corporate activities such as return on assets, 
investment, leverage, and cash holdings.
6 However, their MDV method is only used on a 
relatively small dataset, while the AKM method can separately identify manager fixed effects 
from firm fixed effects for a much larger set of executives. The typically used spell method 
also has limitations. Frank and Goyal (2007) find that adding manager fixed effects to a 
regression analysis of the determinants of leverage significantly increases the model fit.
7 
However, the spell fixed effects method cannot disentangle manager from firm fixed effects. 
As a result, the exact power of manager fixed effects in explaining leverage variation is unclear. 
The AKM method avoids the shortcomings of the other two methods and has broad 
potential in many finance and accounting research areas where capturing firm- and manager-
specific effects is desirable. For example, one could examine manager and firm fixed effects in 
various corporate activities, which include but are not limited to corporate investment and 
financial policies, and earnings management, among others (Coles and Li, 2011a, 2011b). Or 
                                                 
6 Bertrand and Schoar (2003) do not investigate managerial fixed effects in compensation, though they do find 
that managers with higher return on assets manager fixed effects have greater excess compensation. 
7 Lemmon et al. (2008) study the role of firm fixed effects (not manager fixed effects) in determining leverage and 
find that firm fixed effects are an important factor in explaining leverage. 
  5one may be interested in separately investigating mutual fund manager fixed effects and fund 
company fixed effects in mutual fund performance, or analyst fixed effects and brokerage firm 
fixed effects in earnings forecasts. 
Our results should be interpreted with two points in mind. First, fixed effects may lead 
to over-controlling if some determinants of executive pay move slowly through time. That is, if 
the explanatory variable of interest mainly varies cross-sectionally, then fixed effects could 
absorb the variation of interest. The fixed effects approach is more suitable when the 
explanatory variables of interest present sufficient time series variation. Second, the fixed 
effects model provides a simple method to address the omitted variable bias issue if omitted 
variables or unobserved factors are time constant or slow moving. However, fixed effects are 
unable to solve the omitted variable problem or the selection problem caused by time-variant 
unobserved factors.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the empirical 
methodology; the Appendix B explores related statistical issues in greater detail. Section 3 
describes the data, variables, and summary statistics. Results, implications, and robustness tests 
are given in Section 4. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Empirical  Methodology 
2.1  A Three-Way Fixed Effects Model of Compensation 
To motivate the empirical specification, first consider a simple model of human capital 
in the spirit of Becker (1993) and Mincer (1974). Let HCit denote manager i’s stock of human 
capital at time t, while Ut denotes the time t rental rate of human capital. Hence, the 
individual’s expected wage rate yit can be determined as 
  6it t it HC U y × =   .             (1) 
Assume that human capital is reflected in the observable firm and manager characteristics, Wjt 
and Xit, and the latent firm and person specific inputs, φj and θi. Then the exponential form of 
production function gives 
                                     .                                                                            (2) 
i j jt it W X
it e HC
θ ϕ γ β + + + =
Combining equations (1) and (2) and taking the logarithms yields the standard human capital 
log wage function as 
Ln(yit) = Xit β + Wjt γ + φj + θi + μt ,                 (3) 
where μt = Ln(Ut). Adding an error term εit to the theoretical equation (3) gives the empirically 
estimable equation  
Ln(yit)= Xit β + Wjt γ +  φj + θi + μt + εit .                          (4) 
Equation (4) indicates that an executive’s expected compensation is the sum of the 
market valuation of his or her personal characteristics Xitβ+θi (observable and unobservable), 
the specific compensation policies Wjtγ+φj chosen by the executive’s employer (observable and 
unobservable), and time effects in compensation μt. Residual εit reflects a manager’s residual 
compensation, which captures the compensation that is not priced in the labor market given a 
manager’s observable and unobservable human capital. This model assumes that for any given 
manager i, θi is constant over time, whether the manager stays in the same firm or moves to a 
new employer. Consistent with Frydman (2007) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2007), 
managers’ general skills that are transferable across companies can be captured by θi.
8 The 
time-invariant component φj of firm-specific compensation policies could reflect the time-
                                                 
8 Managerial ability is just one interpretation of manager fixed effects θi. θi could capture managerial traits other 
than ability as long as these traits are time invariant or slow moving. 
  7invariant dimension of corporate monitoring or incentive considerations or the compensation 
premia in firms with persistently abnormal profit (Abowd et al., 2003). 
In model (4), there are three fixed effects: manager fixed effect θi, firm fixed effect φj, 
and year fixed effect μt. This three-way fixed effects model is our main specification 
throughout the paper. The model provides a way to mitigate the omitted variable bias common 
in our applications if the relevant omitted variables are primarily time invariant. For example, 
firm size, an explanatory variable frequently used in finance, is likely correlated with manager-
specific innate ability and firm-specific corporate policies. In a model that does not capture 
both manager and firm fixed effects, the unobserved person and firm heterogeneities are 
absorbed into the error term ε, causing correlations between the error term and explanatory 
variables. Such correlations violate the exogeneity condition and lead to inconsistent and 
biased estimates of β and γ. The fixed effects model, by separating unobserved time invariant 
heterogeneities from the error term, provides consistent, unbiased, and generally efficient 
estimates of β and γ, as long as the error in (4) is uncorrelated with observable characteristics 
(X and W) and fixed effects (θ, φ, and μ). Model (4) also allows fixed effects themselves to be 
arbitrarily correlated with explanatory variables X and W (Wooldridge, 2001). 
2.2 Estimation  Methods 
2.2.1  Spell Fixed Effects Method 
The spell method creates a dummy variable, Vs, for each  unique combination of 
manager i and firm j (i.e., for each spell). The spell level heterogeneity Vs is equal to φj + θi, 
and Equation (4) can be rewritten as Ln(yit)= Xit β + Wjt γ + Vs+ μt + εit . The model is thus 
reduced to a two-way fixed effects model and can be estimated on the full sample using 
standard fixed effects approaches, which include the within approach and the least square 
  8dummy variable (LSDV) approach. The spell approach has been used in the literature (Abowd 
et al., 1999, Munch and Skaksen, 2008, and Schank et al., 2007) to control the influence of 
manager and firm fixed effects in a manner that addresses possible omitted variable bias. 
However, using this approach, one can only estimate the joint manager-firm fixed effects Vs 
and cannot separately identify φj and θi. To separate the firm from manager fixed effects, one 
should use the MDV method or the AKM method, which are discussed below.  
2.2.2 The  Mover  Dummy  Variable (MDV) Method 
We are interested in not only controlling for unobserved manager θi and firm φj fixed 
effects but, in some parts of the analysis, we are also interested in estimating the magnitudes of 
each fixed effect separately. Intuitively, if a company has no managerial turnover during the 
sample period, the firm’s fixed effect cannot be disentangled from the fixed effects of its 
managers because the two effects are perfectly collinear. Therefore, the separation of manager 
fixed effects from firm fixed effects is only possible when the firm has at least one mover (i.e., 
a manager who switches companies). The mover dummy variable (MDV) method used in 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) restricts the sample to movers, includes dummy variables for each 
manager and each firm, and then estimates Equation (4) using the least square dummy variable 
(LSDV) approach.  
One disadvantage of the MDV approach is that managers who have moved could be 
different from managers who never change firms, and the resulting sample selection bias could 
limit the generalizability of the results. Another disadvantage is that this method may face 
computer limitations related to inverting a matrix with many dummy variables in very large 
samples (see Appendix B.1 for details). This second disadvantage is less significant unless the 
  9dataset is quite large. Due to these limitations, in the next section we introduce an alternative 
method to separate the fixed effects.  
2.2.3 The  Abowd,  Kramarz,  and Margolis (AKM) Method 
The alternative method we use to separate firm from manager fixed effects is based on 
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). The AKM method, by identifying manager and firm 
fixed effects through group connection, allows us to separate firm and manager fixed effects 
not only for movers but also for non-moving executives, as long as the non-movers work in 
firms that have hired at least one mover. Group connection is defined as follows. Start with an 
arbitrary individual and include all the companies for which he or she has ever worked. Next, 
add all the individuals who have ever worked in any of those companies. Continue adding all 
additional firms for which any of these individuals has ever worked and all additional 
individuals in any of those firms until no more individuals or firms can be added to the current 
group. Repeat for the next group and continue until all data are exhausted. Hence, every person 
and firm belongs to exactly one group and within every group all the persons and firms are 
connected somehow. The detailed algorithm of forming groups can be found in Abowd et al. 
(2002). We discuss the technical details of the AKM method in Appendix B. 
Connectedness is related to, but is not identical to, mobility. A manager who has never 
moved can be connected to another company as long as at least one other manager in his or her 
firm has worked at the other company. Therefore, a small amount of mobility can generate a 
large amount of connectedness. Within each group, there is person mobility, which connects 
persons and firms in this group. Between groups, there is no mobility. Abowd et al. (1999) 
formally prove that connectedness is necessary and sufficient for the separate identification of 
  10person and firm fixed effects. Mobility, a requirement of the MDV method, is sufficient but is 
not a necessary condition.  
Although only a moderate proportion of managers have changed firms in our sample, 
these turnovers allow us to separate a large number of manager and firm fixed effects through 
group connection. We refer to this larger sample retained by the AKM method as the 
connectedness sample, while the sample used in the MDV method that includes only movers is 
called the mobility sample. Note that these two samples contain the same firms. The mobility 
sample includes only movers from these firms, while the connectedness sample includes both 
movers and non-movers in these firms. One benefit of the larger connectedness sample is the 
increased precision of the model estimates (see Appendix B.2 for details). 
Abowd et al. (2004) and Andrews et al. (2008) show that when worker mobility is 
limited, there may be estimation bias that causes the person and firm effects to be estimated 
imprecisely. The intuition is that we use the mover information to figure out the firm fixed 
effects. When the number of movers goes up, we have more information and thus the firm 
fixed effects (and then the manager fixed effects) can be estimated more precisely. The limited 
mobility bias is present in both the MDV and the AKM methods because both methods depend 
on the mover information to identify the fixed effects. Consequently, the results for both MDV 
and AKM need to be interpreted with this limitation in mind.   
Below, we start by using the spell method in the full sample, then use AKM as our 
primary method to disentangle manager and firm fixed effects in the connectedness sample. 
We use MDV on the mobility sample to test the robustness of the results. 
 
3.  Data and Summary Statistics 
  113.1 Sample  Selection 
Our sample consists of a matched ExecuComp-Compustat panel dataset from 1992 to 
2006. This dataset allows us to track through time the highest paid executives in firms covered 
by ExecuComp. We merge the manager-level ExecuComp data with firm-level annual 
accounting variables from Compustat and firm-level stock returns from CRSP. We then 
remove observations with incomplete data. Our full sample includes 25,586 managers who 
have worked for 2,344 firms. When we use the spell method to control for the influence of 
unobserved firm and manager heterogeneities, we estimate based on this full sample.  
Because managerial mobility or connectedness is necessary to permit the separation of 
manager fixed effects from firm fixed effects, Table 1 presents information on the movers and 
stayers in our sample. Panel A shows that during the sample period from 1992 through 2006, 
4.9% or 1,256 managers are movers who worked as top executives in more than one company 
in the sample, while the rest (95.1%) are non-movers who worked in a single sample firm.
9  
[Table 1 about here] 
Panel B provides information on the proportion of companies that have a given number 
of top managers who move during the sample period. About 45% of the sample firms do not 
have any managers who move across companies, while the remaining 55% (1,272 firms) have 
manager switchers. We are able to identify fixed effects for all the managers who are or were 
in these 1,272 firms, irrelevant of whether they move or not. When we want to separately 
identify manager fixed effects from firm fixed effects using the AKM method, we perform our 
analysis on the subsample of the firms (i.e., 55% of the full sample) in which there are movers. 
This “someone at the firm moved” sample (i.e., connectedness sample) includes 15,352 
                                                 
9 Note that we are only able to capture managers’ movements within ExecuComp firms. It is possible for a 
manager to move to or from a firm that is not in the sample; we are unable to trace such activity due to data 
limitations. 
  12managers who have worked for 1,272 firms. The mobility sample (analyzed with the MDV 
method) includes 1,256 movers and the 1,272 firms at which they were employed.  
3.2 Sample  Description 
In Table 2, we follow the methodology in Brav et al. (2005) and investigate whether the 
connectedness sample is representative of the original full sample. Panel A summarizes the 
representativeness of the continuous variables used in the study.
10 We first compare the overall 
averages and medians of each variable for the connectedness sample to the full ExecuComp 
sample (i.e., the universe of ExecuComp firms with valid data). We then sort the full sample 
into quintiles and report the quintile mean for each variable. We also report the mean and the 
percentage of the connectedness sample firms that fall into each quintile, based on the full 
sample quintile breakpoints for each variable. The reported percentages can be compared with 
the benchmark 20%. In Panel B, we compare the summary statistics of indicator variables for 
the connectedness sample and the full sample. These analyses allow us to infer whether our 
connectedness sample is representative of the universe of ExecuComp firms and, if so, in 
which dimensions. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The analyses show that the connectedness sample is fairly representative of the full 
sample, except that the connectedness sample firms are somewhat larger and executives in 
such firms are somewhat better paid. In unreported analysis, we compare the connectedness 
sample firms to the top four size quintiles of the full sample (i.e., we remove the bottom 
quintile of ExecuComp firms in terms of total assets). We find that controlling for firm size in 
this manner, the connectedness sample firms are representative in all remaining dimensions, 
                                                 
10 The definitions of the variables used in our analysis are reported in the data appendix. 
  13and thus we conclude that the difference in pay for the two samples is related to firm size. We, 
therefore, control for firm size in all our regression analysis. 
Table 2 also provides summary statistics for both the full sample and the connectedness 
sample (we focus our discussion on the latter). The managers in the connectedness sample 
receive average compensation of $2.2 million and median compensation of $1.1 million. This 
implies a large positive skewness in the level of executive pay. The average (median) cash-
based compensation (i.e., salary plus bonus) paid to the managers is $0.7 ($0.5) million, 
accounting for about 55% of total compensation, and the average (median) equity-based 
compensation is $1.2 ($0.3) million, accounting for 35% of total compensation. The average 
(median) managerial tenure is around 10 (8) years and 17% of sample managers are CEOs.  
 
4. Empirical  Results 
4.1    The Economic Importance of Unobserved Firm and Manager 
Heterogeneities 
4.1.1  Determinants of Executive Compensation   
In this section, we analyze how unobserved firm and manager effects are related to 
compensation. We follow prior research in selecting the observable characteristics that 
determine the level of executive pay (see, for example, Core et al., 2008, Core et al., 1999, 
Murphy, 1999, and Rose and Shepard, 1997). Specifically, we regress the logarithm of total 
compensation on firm-level variables such as firm size, growth, stock returns, accounting 
returns, and return volatility, and on manager-level variables such as managerial tenure and 
whether the manager is a CEO. Year fixed effects are included to capture the impact of 
  14economic conditions as well as other potential year differences on pay level.
11Our main 
dependent variable is log(total compensation), where total compensation is ExecuComp data 
item TDC1 (measured in $thousands) and is comprised of salary, bonus, other annual, total 
value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), 
long-term incentive payouts, and all other total. Our main results and implications remain 
similar when we separately analyze log(salary plus bonus), log(stock plus option 
compensation), cash compensation as a proportion of total pay, and stock plus option 
compensation as a proportion of total pay as dependent variables. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 reports our analysis of the determinants of log(total compensation) using the 
spell method in the full sample. Regression (1) is a pooled OLS regression without firm or 
manager fixed effects. The adjusted R-squared for this regression is 49%, which is similar to 
the adjusted R-squared found in previous studies, such as Core et al. (1999). In regression (2), 
we add firm fixed effects to account for unobservable differences across firms. The adjusted R-
squared in this specification increases to 66%. This indicates that unobservable firm 
heterogeneity (such as firm quality, firm culture about compensation practice, etc.) plays a 
significant role in explaining executive pay. In regression (3), we add manager fixed effects 
instead of firm fixed effects. The adjusted R-squared is 76%, a 27% absolute increase 
compared with the pooled OLS specification, and a 10% increase over the firm fixed effects 
specification. This suggests that unobservable managerial traits (such as leadership styles, 
personalities, abilities, etc.) have substantial explanatory power in determining managerial 
compensation. In regression (4), we control for both unobservable firm-level and manager-
                                                 
11 Executive pay could be abnormally high (due to a signing bonus, severance pay, etc.) during the years when 
managers join or leave a company. When we add a dummy variable which equals one for the year that a manager 
joined or left a company, the results are essentially the same.  
  15level differences and the adjusted R-squared increases to 77%. Finally, in specifications (2) 
through (4), F tests suggest that these firm/manager fixed effects are jointly significantly 
different from zero.  
The significant improvement in the adjusted R-square in the three-way fixed effects 
regression indicates that firm and manager fixed effects play an important role in explaining 
executive pay. Nevertheless, we note that the goal of empirical research is not to increase the 
R-square per se. Ultimately, one of our objectives is to understand the implications that the 
inclusion (or exclusion) of unobservable firm and managerial characteristics has on empirical 
executive compensation research. We explore this issue in detail in Section 4.1.3.   
4.1.2  Relative Importance of Different Factors in Determining 
Compensation 
In this section, we explore the relative economic importance of time-invariant firm and 
managerial heterogeneities and other factors. Such analysis requires separate identification of 
firm and manager fixed effects and thus we perform the AKM regression on the connectedness 
sample. The results reported in Panel A of Table 4 show that all the implications we obtain 
from the full sample regressions in Table 3 also hold for the connectedness sample.  
We next use the coefficient estimates from the AKM three-way fixed effects regression 
(4) in Panel A of Table 4 to separate out the following components: observable time-variant 
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12 We examine 
how much each of these components contributes to the total variation in executive pay, using 
                                                 
12   The observable firm or manager characteristics are time-variant because observable time-invariant 
characteristics (such as a female dummy) are absorbed into the manager or firm fixed effects.  
  16the covariance between log(compensation) and each of the components, normalized by the 
variance of log(compensation). Note that model R-squared is calculated as  
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where  Ln(yit) is the dependent variable log(total compensation). Therefore, the normalized 
covariance (excluding residuals) may be interpreted as a decomposition of model R-squared, 
with the covariance values corresponding to the fractions of the model sum of squares 
attributable to particular factors.
13 
[Table 4 about here] 
We find that the normalized covariance of manager fixed effects, time-variant firm 
characteristics, firm fixed effects, and time-variant manager characteristics with 
log(compensation) are 0.44, 0.20, 0.04, and 0.04, respectively (Table 4, Panel B, Column (3)). 
Year effects and residuals each have a normalized covariance of 0.09 and 0.19. As a result, the 
fraction of the model sum of squares attributed to manager fixed effects is 54% (0.44/(1-0.19)), 
observable firm characteristics 25%, firm fixed effects 5%, and observable manager 
characteristics 5%. Manager fixed effects contribute the most to model R-squared, and 
                                                 
13 In unreported analysis, we also follow Lemmon et al. (2008) and use analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine 
the relative importance of each factor in explaining the variation in executive pay. We obtain similar implications. 
Specifically, in this alternative analysis we first obtain a Type III partial sum of squares for each factor, and then 
divide the partial sum for each factor by the total partial sum of squares over all factors for a particular model. 
One thing to note is that the normalized partial sum of squares should not be interpreted as the exact share of the 
model R-square; rather, it represents the relative power of each factor in reducing the residual sum of squares 
given that all the other factors have been included in the model.  
  17observable time-variant firm characteristics are the second most important factor in explaining 
the variation in the level of executive pay. 
In addition, the averages and standard deviations of log(compensation) and various 
components shown in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, Panel B help us interpret the economic 
magnitude of manager and firm fixed effects. Among all the components, manager and firm 
fixed effects have the largest and the second largest standard deviations and the values of the 
standard deviations are of an order similar to that of log(compensation). This indicates that a 
one standard deviation change of manager or firm fixed effects will result in roughly a one 
standard deviation change in log(compensation). More specifically, when manager fixed 
effects increase by one standard deviation of 1.13, log(compensation) changes from the 
average level of 7.08 to 8.21 (7.08+1.13), which can be translated into a change in total 
compensation from $1.2 million to $3.7 million. In other words, a one standard deviation 
increase in manager fixed effects will increase executive compensation by $2.5 million on 
average, which is economically important. Similarly, when firm fixed effects increase by one 
standard deviation of 0.97, log(compensation) changes from the average level of 7.08 to 8.05 
and this corresponds to a change in total compensation from $1.2 million to $3.1 million.  
The results presented so far indicate that time-invariant executive-specific 
heterogeneity is an important component and has significant incremental explanatory power 
beyond what is explained by extant determinants. Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting that the 
above analysis does not imply that observable characteristics have little power to explain 
executive pay variation. If the variation in observable characteristics is largely cross-sectional, 
including fixed effects in the regression will decrease the proportion of the variation explained 
by observable determinants because fixed effects will absorb the cross-sectional variation. For 
example, although the observable determinants have a relatively low explanatory power in the 
  18fixed effects analysis, the model that contains observable determinants alone has a high 
adjusted R-square of 49%. Also, the explanatory power of unobserved heterogeneities could be 
overstated if fixed effects absorb some cross-sectional effects from observable variables. 
4.1.3  Implications for Empirical Executive Compensation Research 
We first discuss the general implications of our results for empirical compensation 
research. As mentioned earlier, if unobservable person or firm heterogeneity is correlated with 
the observable characteristics, empirical methods that do not explicitly account for these 
unobservables could result in omitted variable bias. To further shed light on this issue, we 
compare the coefficient estimates in the OLS model with those in the three-way fixed effects 
model. We focus on the spell method results in Table 3 to facilitate the discussion (Tables 4 
and 5 give similar implications). An inspection of Columns (1) and (4) in Table 3 reveals that 
the signs of the coefficients are similar in both specifications, but the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are sensitive to the specification. The average change in coefficient magnitude in 
the three-way fixed effects model relative to the OLS model is 50%. A Hausman test that 
compares the two specifications rejects the hypothesis that the OLS estimates are consistent at 
the 1% level. The Hausman test also rejects the hypothesis that time-invariant firm and 
manager heterogeneities are uncorrelated with the observable determinants.
14  Following 
Lemmon et al. (2008), we summarize the implication of ignoring unobserved firm and manager 
differences using Hsiao (2002, page 8): “Ignoring the individual effects that exist among cross-
sectional units but are not captured by the included explanatory variables can lead to … 
inconsistent or meaningless estimates of interesting parameters.”   
                                                 
14  Like any specification test, the Hausman test results are suggestive. We also note that it is plausible that 
managerial fixed effects are correlated with observable determinants. For example, managerial fixed effects 
partially reflect talent, and talent may be correlated with firm size because, on average, firms grow larger when 
run by talented managers. Talent may also be correlated with firm performance because good managers increase 
firm performance.  
  19We now discuss the specific implications of our results in the context of existing 
empirical evidence on executive compensation. Recent research relates the level of pay to firm 
size to justify an efficient contracting view that high pay is the result of optimal contracting in 
a competitive market for managerial talent. In the theories developed by Gabaix and Landier 
(2008) and Tervio (2008), better skilled managers match with larger firms. Due to the 
complementarity between managerial skill and firm size in production, moderately better 
managerial skill could lead to significantly greater profits for a large company. Consequently, 
compared with smaller companies, larger firms are willing to offer much higher wages. Gabaix 
and Landier (2008) empirically test the relation between the level of pay and firm size. Using a 
pooled OLS regression and the 1000 highest paid CEOs in the ExecuComp data from 1992 to 
2004, they find that the coefficient of log(market value) in the equation with the dependent 
variable being log(total pay) is equal to 0.37 (see Table II of their paper).
15 They thus conclude 
that the elasticity of CEO pay to firm size is roughly 1/3.
16 
  We derive similar results when using OLS regressions in our study, as Table 3 
exemplifies. Log(assets), a proxy for firm size, is positively related to pay with a coefficient of 
0.37 in the OLS regression. Once we include manager fixed effects, the coefficient declines 
significantly to 0.22. The decline (0.37-0.22) in the coefficients is significant, with a t-statistic 
of 11.95. The coefficient of 0.37 in the OLS model indicates that when log(assets) increases by 
one standard deviation of 1.76, executive pay increases by 92% (exp(0.37×1.76)-1). The three-
way fixed effects coefficient of 0.22 indicates that the percentage increase in pay caused by a 
one standard deviation increase in firm size is 47% (exp(0.22×1.76)-1). This calculation 
                                                 
15  Frydman and Saks (2010) also test the relation between compensation and firm size using historical 
compensation data ranging from 1936 to 2005 for the largest 50 firms. Their OLS regression gives a similar 
coefficient of 0.29 to 0.36 for the period from 1976 to 2005.  
16 Gabaix and Landier (2008) control for firm fixed effects (but not manager fixed effects) in one of their models 
and find a coefficient estimate of 0.26. However, they base their conclusions on the OLS regression results.  
  20roughly implies that the impact of firm size on pay in the OLS model is nearly double what it 
is in the three-way fixed effects model. Further, the estimate of 0.22 suggests that the elasticity 
of CEO pay to firm size is about 1/5, lower than what is documented in the literature. Thus the 
takeaway is that when fixed effects are controlled, the correlation between firm size and 
executive pay is significantly smaller than previously documented.
17  
Next, we examine how including fixed effects aids interpretation of the pay increases 
associated with being CEO. The coefficient on the CEO indicator is 0.9 in the OLS model and 
drops to 0.3 in the manager fixed effects model. The CEO indicator potentially captures two 
influences on compensation: the CEO’s person-specific effect (i.e., the person who becomes 
CEO is more skillful) and a job promotion effect (i.e., the pay increase resulting from a non-
CEO being promoted to CEO). In models without manager fixed effects, the CEO indicator 
captures both factors. In models with manager fixed effects, the person-specific effect is 
absorbed into manager fixed effects and the CEO indicator captures the promotion effect only. 
The results suggest that, holding other variables unchanged, overall, a CEO is paid 150% 
(exp(0.9)-1) more than a non-CEO. For the same person, the pay increase due to promotion to 
CEO is only 35% (exp(0.3)-1).
18 Thus, the three-way fixed effects analysis allows us to isolate 
the promotion effect from the combined promotion plus person-specific effect. 
We close this section by mentioning two major caveats to using fixed effects models. 
First, our analysis does not imply that every empirical specification should include firm and 
                                                 
17 We alternatively use the sum of net debt and the market capitalization of equity as the proxy for firm size (as do 
Gabaix and Landier, 2008). This proxy is forward-looking and takes into account intangible assets. Our results are 
robust to this firm size variable.  
18 Note that the CEO dummy is not perfectly collinear with manager fixed effects because, in our panel dataset, a 
particular manager could be a non-CEO executive during some periods and a CEO in other periods.
  The 
identification of the coefficient on the CEO dummy in the presence of manager fixed effects relies on some 
executives being promoted from a non-CEO to a CEO or vice versa. In addition, besides using a CEO dummy to 
capture a promotion to CEO effect, one can include a CFO dummy, COO dummy, etc. to separate the promotion 
effect to these job titles from the person-specific effect. When we do this, we find that the most important of these 
variables by far is the CEO indicator variable. 
  21manager fixed effects. The decision of whether or not to employ a fixed effects model depends 
on the goal of the research. In fact, the fixed effects approach fails if one wants to examine the 
direct impact of time invariant variables (such as CEO education, birth year, gender, etc.) on 
pay because these variables are absorbed into the fixed effects. Hence, if the explanatory 
variable of interest mainly varies cross-sectionally, then fixed effects could potentially wipe 
out the variation of interest.
19 Our fixed effects approach is more suitable when the explanatory 
variables of interest present sufficient time series (within manager) variation. Therefore, when 
employing the fixed effects model, one should interpret the results with the above limitation in 
mind, especially for variables of interest that mainly vary cross-sectionally and are highly time 
persistent. 
The other caveat relates to the ability of the fixed effects model to address omitted 
variable bias. If omitted relevant variables or unobserved factors are time constant or at least 
slow moving, then the fixed effects model provides a simple and intuitive method to address 
the bias.
20 However, if the unobserved factors are time-changing, controlling for fixed effects 
is not sufficient to solve the omitted variable problem. Under this circumstance, using the fixed 
effects model does not help address the causality issues that researchers are often interested in; 
other methods (such as instrumental variables) are needed.  
4.1.4  Robustness Analysis 
In this section, we conduct tests to verify the robustness of the findings reported above. 
First, as mentioned previously, to deduce the information for non-movers, the AKM analysis 
depends on information about movers. When the number of movers that can be used to 
                                                 
19 For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) do not adopt the firm fixed effects approach in studying the effect 
of managerial ownership on firm value because the primary force driving the results is between-firm variation 
(page 107).  
20 As noted in Lemmon et al. (2008), alternative ways to address omitted variable bias, or endogeneity bias more 
generally, include first differencing, structural estimation, and natural experiments.   
  22estimate fixed effects is relatively limited, the idiosyncratic component of each move may 
weigh heavily on the estimation and potentially increase the estimation errors of non-movers’ 
fixed effects. The resulting noisy estimation of manager fixed effects may not be truly purged 
of firm-level influences, and this may exaggerate the explanatory power of person fixed effects. 
To address this concern, in Table 5, Panels A and B, we implement the MDV approach used in 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003). By restricting the sample to only managers who have moved 
between firms and ignoring all non-mover managers, the MDV method avoids the concern 
about using the information on a limited number of moving managers to back out non-movers’ 
fixed effects.  
Our main results remain intact when we apply the MDV method. As before, time 
invariant manager and firm heterogeneities contribute important explanatory power to the 
determination of executive pay and controlling for these unobserved heterogeneities mitigates 
potential omitted variable bias. When we decompose the variation in pay into several 
components using the estimates from the MDV approach, the results, reported in Panel B of 
Table 5, show that manager fixed effects continue to contribute the most (a share of 39%) to 
the model R-squared.
21 Overall, then, the main economic interpretations of the paper are the 
same with either the MDV method or the AKM method.
22 
The separation of firm and manager fixed effects would be more precise if one had 
more movers in the sample. Given the limitations of executive compensation data, we 
                                                 
21  Using the AKM method, the shares contributed by manager and firm fixed effects are 54% and 5%, in 
comparison to shares of 39% and 19% with the MDV method. Appendix B.2 explains in detail the reasons for the 
differences in these numbers.  
22  Our results consistently indicate that manager fixed effects play a more significant role in explaining 
compensation than do firm fixed effects. The results, however, should not be interpreted as indicating firm fixed 
effects’ unimportance. In fact, in the MDV sample, which includes movers only, firm fixed effects contribute at 
least 10% of R-squared (We show in Appendix B.2 that firm fixed effects play a more significant role in 
explaining compensation in samples with a larger proportion of movers). See Appendix B.2 and B.3 for further 
details.  
  23acknowledge that the separation of firm and manger fixed effects is potentially noisy. However, 
it is important to emphasize that our results in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.3 do not depend on the 
separation of firm and manager fixed effects. The results from these sections imply that 
including both types of fixed effects is important when interpreting compensation regressions. 
This implication holds for the full sample, the connectedness sample, and the mobility sample, 
and also for the spell, MDV, and AKM methods.  
[Table 5 about here] 
The second robustness issue to consider is the possibility of matching. A manager may 
move to a company for which he is a better match, and receive a wage increase in the 
process.
23 Such a wage increase could result in a larger fixed effect estimate for the company 
that the manager matches with, although this larger fixed effect is not due to firm-specific 
heterogeneity in pay policy. That is, this matching possibility could contaminate our estimation 
of fixed effects; this problem is common to both the MDV and the AKM methods. We address 
this concern in two ways.  
First, we note that a better match may be partially reflected in improved firm 
performance, which in turn leads to higher compensation. We control for firm performance in 
all our model specifications. Second, we examine a subsample of movers in which the 
matching issue is arguably less problematic. This subsample includes only the managers whose 
movement between firms results in a small change (within ±25%) in total compensation.
24 
Although the maximum change is 25%, the mean (median) change in total compensation for 
this subsample of managers is small (equal to 0.78% (1.1%)). Given such a small change in 
total compensation, there is little if any evidence of matching in this subsample. Our results are 
                                                 
23 For example, Parrino and Srinivasan (2009) find that CEOs with marketing backgrounds are more likely to be 
appointed by firms with larger advertising expenditures. 
24 The results are similar if we use ±10%, ±15%, and ±20% as cutoffs. 
  24robust to this subsample analysis (reported in Table 5, Panels C and D). Including manager or 
firm fixed effects increases R-squared by half, and including both fixed effects increases R-
squared by 70%. Also, manager fixed effects contribute the most to the model sum of squares, 
with a share of 68% in explaining the variation in pay. These findings continue to indicate the 
importance of including firm and manager fixed effects. 
Despite these attempts to deal with the endogenous matching issue, we acknowledge 
that out efforts do not completely eliminate the matching/selection problem. In fact, the 
matching issue is present in some form in any employer-employee matched dataset (including 
the full ExecuComp dataset) and is not a by-product of our methodologies. In models that do 
not control for fixed effects, such as an OLS regression, matching can affect the coefficient 
estimates because matching between firms and managers could be correlated with executive 
pay as well as explanatory variables such as firm performance, firm size, and job tenure. If 
matching is only based on observable characteristics and time-invariant effects and does not 
depend on unobserved time-variant influences, our fixed effects approach actually provides a 
simple and intuitive way to address the potential matching problem that might arise when 
studying compensation or similar data. That is, using fixed effects controls for time-constant 
factors that affect managers’ selecting or being selected into companies. For example, talent is 
a key factor that affects managers’ sorting into companies and our inclusion of manager fixed 
effects in the model presents one way to address the selection problem associated with 
managerial talent. However, we note that if managers and firms are matched on the basis of not 
only observable characteristics and fixed effects, but also unobserved time variant person and 
firm effects, then none of the methods can fully address the matching problem.
25  
                                                 
25 Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) use the fixed effects approach to address endogenous matching in the labor 
market. They state that “if … unobserved characteristics are constant …, panel techniques can eliminate the 
  25 
4.2   Discussion of Estimated Manager Fixed Effects 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of manager fixed effects, estimated using the AKM 
method in the connectedness sample (i.e., regression (4) of Table 4, Panel A). Since fixed 
effects are estimated relative to a benchmark, the mean and the location of the estimated fixed 
effects may change when different benchmarks are used. However, the shape of the 
distribution and the standard deviation of fixed effects do not depend on benchmarks. The 
graph shows that the estimated manager fixed effects are roughly normally distributed, with a 
standard deviation of 1.12. To the extent that manager fixed effects can be interpreted as the 
time-invariant component of ability, this standard deviation suggests that there is a fair amount 
of variation in managerial ability across managers. This estimate could help parameterize 
models that proxy for variation in skill, such as Taylor (2010). Note that such an exercise needs 
to be implemented with caution because manager fixed effects could reflect the time-invariant 
dimension of a variety of managerial attributes, which include not only talent and ability but 
also risk aversion, propensity to exert effort, bargaining power, managerial entrenchment, etc.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
We also find that the fixed effects estimated from the AKM method and the fixed 
effects from the MDV method are highly correlated at 0.77 (reported in Appendix B Table A1), 
suggesting that manager fixed effects estimated from the two methods are similar. Compared 
with the graph for the AKM fixed effects in Figure 1, the distribution for the MDV fixed 
                                                                                                                                                          
endogeneity problem.” They then mention that the fixed effects approach “addresses the potential ‘two-sided’ 
matching problem in our data, where unobserved principal characteristics may be correlated with observed agent 
characteristics and unobserved agent characteristics may be correlated with observed principal characteristics.” 
The existing literature (Abowd et al., 1999, Bertrand and Schoar, 2003, and Goux and Maurin, 1999, among 
others) acknowledges that a more complicated endogenous matching problem (in which managers and firms are 
matched based on unobserved time variant effects) is a challenging issue for future research. 
  26effects (Appendix B Figure A1) has a similar shape, but a slightly higher dispersion and fatter 
tails. One possible explanation is that the mobility sample is much smaller than the 
connectedness sample: the number of observations in the mobility sample is only one-eighth 
that of the connectedness sample. Greater dispersion in the MDV fixed effects could be the 
result of higher standard errors caused by a smaller sample.  
The evidence provided thus far indicates that a significant part of the executive pay 
level is determined by managerial attributes that are not captured by the variables that financial 
researchers commonly include in their empirical analyses. We investigate what these attributes 
might be by hand collecting the personal characteristics of the CEOs in S&P 500 companies. 
These characteristics include education, gender, year of birth, and the year the executive 
became a CEO. We perform a cross-sectional regression of the previously estimated 
managerial fixed effects on these hand-collected personal traits. The regression results (Table 6) 
show that education is positive and significant, indicating that CEOs with more advanced 
degrees have higher compensation fixed effects. Because education is often used as a proxy for 
talent in the literature (Abowd et al., 1999, 2003), our results provide suggestive evidence that 
the compensation fixed effects partially reflect managerial talent.  
[Table 6 about here] 
Note, however, that the R-squared of regressing fixed effects on education and other 
personal characteristics is only 1%, thus these variables explain a very small proportion of the 
variation in compensation fixed effects. The rest of the variation is likely attributable to factors 
that are very difficult to quantify or for which the data are difficult or impossible for 
researchers to obtain. Such factors might include CEO power, personalities, risk attitudes, 
social connections, etc. In unreported analysis, we constrain the sample to CEOs and perform a 
pooled OLS regression similar to that in Column (1) of Table 4, Panel A, with the education 
  27variable included. Compared with the specification that excludes the education variable, the 
improvement in the R-squared is only 0.1%. This result is consistent with the findings in the 
labor economics literature that only a small part of person-specific wage components can be 
explained by education and other available personal characteristics (Abowd et al., 2003).
26  
  
4.3 Management  Styles 
In this section, we examine management styles and study whether different styles or 
traits are remunerated accordingly. Using both the AKM and MDV methods, we estimate 
managerial fixed effects in corporate policies, which include research and development 
spending (R&D), capital investment, leverage, cash holdings, and dividend payout. These 
managerial fixed effects in corporate policies are termed “management styles” in Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003). We relate manager fixed policy effects to compensation effects by estimating 
the following regression: 
FE(comp)i = α + β×FE(z)i + εi ,                 (6) 
where i indexes managers, FE(comp) represents manager fixed effects in compensation, and 
FE(z) represents manager fixed effects in a particular policy variable, z. We report the β 
estimates in Table 7. A significant β indicates that compensation fixed effects are significantly 
associated with policy fixed effects. Note that Equation (6) is a cross-sectional regression 
because FE(comp) and FE(z) are time invariant. As a result, we interpret the estimated 
coefficients as correlations instead of causal relations between fixed effects. In addition, 
because manager fixed policy effects FE(z), as independent variables in Equation (6), are 
                                                 
26 Our main specifications in Tables 3-5 do not include the education variable because educational information is 
sparse for non-CEO executives. Adding the education variable in the main regressions would greatly reduce the 
sample size. Further, the education variable is time constant and would be absorbed into fixed effects. 
  28estimated from regressions, the β estimates are subject to classical measurement error and will 
be biased toward zero under standard econometric assumptions (Wooldridge, 2001).  
[Table 7 about here] 
Column (1) of Table 7, using the fixed effects estimated from the AKM approach, 
shows that compensation fixed effects are positively related to R&D, investment, leverage, and 
dividend payout fixed effects, and are negatively related to cash holding fixed effects. The 
results using the fixed effects estimated from the MDV method (column (2)) generally have 
similar directions but are statistically weaker, possibly due to fewer observations and less 
statistical power. These results suggest that high and low fixed effects in compensation 
correspond to differences in management styles across managers. Better paid managers invest 
more, both in R&D and capital investment, employ more debt, pay out more dividends, and 
hold less cash in the company. One interpretation is that different managers have different 
traits. These traits are reflected in different managerial styles and are also priced in pay. For 
example, managers differ in the aggressiveness of their investment and financing choices. Less 
risk averse or less conservative managers may invest more, use more debt, pay out more, and 
hold less cash, and these managers are paid more, possibly as a reward for bearing additional 
risk. 
Finally, we examine the economic significance of the correlations between the fixed 
effects (Table 7, Column 3). We focus on the results from the AKM fixed effects; the MDV 
results have similar economic implications. For example, the difference in the compensation 
fixed effects between the dividend-paying companies and the non-dividend-paying companies 
is 0.26, which can be translated into $659 thousand of annual executive pay. This suggests that 
managers in the dividend-paying companies may systematically differ from those in the non-
dividend-paying companies, and this difference is significantly priced in managerial pay. In 
  29addition, given a one standard deviation change in the capital investment (or R&D) fixed 
effects, the change in the compensation fixed effects corresponds to a change in executive pay 
of about $258 ($180) thousand. These numbers indicate that the correlations between 
compensation and policy fixed effects are economically important.      
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the role of firm and manager fixed effects in explaining executive 
compensation and finds that the majority of the variation in executive pay can be explained by 
these time-invariant firm and managerial effects. The substantial heterogeneities among firms 
and managers could result from differences in corporate culture and in managers’ latent traits, 
such as innate ability, personality, risk aversion, etc., none of which can be easily observed or 
measured. We quantify the relative importance of these firm and manager fixed effects. We 
also show that including firm and managerial fixed effects alters the magnitudes of the 
coefficients estimated for other explanatory variables. Compared to the OLS specification, the 
effect of firm size is notably smaller in the fixed effects specification. We also isolate the effect 
of being promoted to CEO from the person-specific compensation effect and find that the 
former is about one-third of the latter. We further relate the manager fixed compensation 
effects to management styles in corporate policies and find that more aggressive managers 
appear to be remunerated (possibly for the additional risk they bear).   
We believe that accounting for firm and managerial fixed effects represents an advance 
in modeling the determination of executive compensation. The empirical framework in the 
paper provides an approach for dealing with potential omitted variable problems if omitted 
unobserved factors are primarily time invariant. The method we use has potentially broad 
  30applications in finance and accounting in which separately capturing firm- and manager-
specific effects is desirable. This is especially important in the context of the growing attention 
to the role of manager-specific effects in corporate policies. For example, using the AKM 
method, one can examine manager and firm fixed effects in various corporate polices, such as 
investment, capital structure, payout, earnings management, and financial reporting, among 
others. One can also use the method to separately investigate mutual fund manager fixed 
effects and fund company fixed effects in mutual fund performance, and analyst fixed effects 
and brokerage firm fixed effects in earnings forecasts.  
The analysis in the paper, however, is not without limitations. For example, if one is 
studying cross-sectional issues, then the fixed effects approach could wipe out the very 
variation in which one is interested. Also, the approach cannot address the omitted variable 
problem related to time-variant unobserved factors. Future research could investigate two 
exciting areas. First, allowing time variation in and interactions between firm and manager 
fixed effects could represent a significant step because one could then begin to address the 
omitted variable issue caused not only by unobserved time constant factors but also by 
unobserved time changing factors. Second, as new data become available, it will be interesting 
to see which factors (beyond those examined in this paper, which include education, birth 
cohort, and gender) could explain manager fixed effects. These factors could include talent, 
risk preferences, and personalities, among others. Clearly, these issues are very challenging but 
interesting to both labor and financial economists.  
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  34Table 1 
Managerial Mobility 
 
This table provides information on the mobility of sample managers. 
 
Panel A: Number of movers out of all managers  
Mover  Number of firms in which managers 
have been employed  Number of managers  Percent 
No 1  24,330  95.09 
 Subtotal  24,330  95.09 
2 1,164  4.55 
3 84  0.33 
4 7  0.03 
Yes 
5 1  0.00 
 Subtotal  1,256  4.91 
 Total  25,586  100.00 
 
Panel B: Number of movers in a firm 
Number of movers in a firm  Number of firms  Percent  Cumulative 
0 1,072  45.73  45.73 
1-5 650  27.73  73.46 
6-10 351  14.97  88.44 
11-20 224  9.56  97.99 
21-30 39  1.66  99.66 
31-50 8  0.34  100.00 





  35Table 2 
Summary Statistics and Sample Representativeness of the Connectedness Sample 
 
This table provides summary statistics of the variables in the full sample (i.e., the universe of firms in ExecuComp) 
and in the connectedness sample (i.e., the sample that includes all the managers who have worked in companies 
that have hired at least one mover). The table also reports the representativeness of the connectedness sample, 
relative to the universe of ExecuComp firms. The details of the definitions and the measurement of all the 
variables are reported in Appendix A. For the variable leverage, financial (SICs 6000-6999) and utilities (SICs 
4900-4999) firms are excluded because the financial structure is regulated in these industries. Panel A contains the 
statistics of continuous variables. In the table, we first provide the overall universe and sample averages, medians, 
and standard deviations. We then sort all ExecuComp firms with valid data into quintiles and report the universe 
averages for each quintile and the average and percentage of the connectedness sample firms that fall into each 
quintile, based on the universe quintile breakpoints for each variable. The reported percentages can be compared 
with the benchmark 20%. Because more than 20% of firms in the universe and the connectedness sample have 
zero equity-based compensation, we combine the first two quintiles for equity-based compensation; the sample 




Panel A: Summary statistics and representativeness of continuous variables 







stdev  1  2  3 4 5 
Total compensationt  ($thousands)           
Universe  1873.19 902.28 2876.11  267.00  532.21 914.42 1673.45  5978.94 
Sample    2217.79 1098.46 3188.49 272.02  535.15 917.98  1683.95 6108.61 
Sample  percent      15.2  17.7  20.1  22.1  25.0 
             
Salary plus bonust  ($thousands)           
Universe  666.73 453.04 659.30  185.72  313.43  456.92 698.24  1679.35 
Sample    728.52 503.55 693.82  186.95  314.48  459.07 701.13  1685.77 
Sample  percent      15.7  18.6  20.6  21.8  23.3 
             
Equity-based compensationt  ($thousands)         
Universe  950.45 252.69  2034.89  32.02  261.48 702.93  3723.89 
Sample    1168.98 348.78 2285.71  31.67  265.28  709.05 3850.35 
Sample  percent      34.2 19.3  21.7  24.8 
             
Tenuret (years)             
Universe  10.06 8.16  7.81 2.12  5.71 8.20 11.66 22.60 
Sample    9.88 8 7.93  2.06  5.78  8.28  11.65  23.02 
Sample  percent      21.4  21.5  18.7  19.3  19.1 
             
Leveraget             
Universe  0.22 0.20 0.18  0.004  0.09  0.20 0.30 0.48 
Sample    0.22 0.21 0.17  0.004  0.09  0.20 0.30 0.48 
Sample  percent      17.9  20.3  21.4  21.5  18.9 
             
Assetst-1  ($millions)            
Universe  7481.59 1230.52  21137.99  168.44  511.38 1275.42 3635.52  31817.51 
Sample    9609.73 1771.80  24084.04  178.54  513.38 1294.91 3640.77  33830.42 
Sample  percent      14.6  17.6  20.3  22.7  24.8 
             
  36Market to bookt-1            
Universe  2.01 1.48 1.48  1.00  1.20  1.49 2.04 4.32 
Sample    2.04 1.51 1.47  1.01  1.20  1.49 2.05 4.27 
Sample  percent      18.7  19.6  20.5  20.5  20.7 
             
Tangibilityt-1             
Universe  0.29 0.23 0.24  0.03  0.13  0.23 0.39 0.69 
Sample    0.29 0.23 0.23  0.03  0.13  0.23 0.40 0.68 
Sample  percent      18.8  20.9  20.5  20.3  19.4 
             
Return on assetst            
Universe  0.047 0.046  0.11  -0.084  0.020  0.047 0.082 0.171 
Sample    0.047 0.046  0.11  -0.082  0.020  0.047 0.083 0.171 
Sample  percent      20.7  19.5  20.0  19.8  19.9 
             
Stock returnt             
Universe  0.19 0.12 0.52  -0.38  -0.06  0.12 0.31 0.95 
Sample    0.18 0.11 0.51  -0.39  -0.06  0.12 0.32 0.93 
Sample  percent      20.3  20.1  19.9  19.8  19.8 
             
Stock return volatilityt            
Universe  0.44 0.39 0.21  0.23  0.31  0.39 0.52 0.77 
Sample    0.44 0.38 0.20  0.23  0.31  0.39 0.52 0.77 
Sample  percent      21.1  21.1  19.9  18.5  19.5 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics and representativeness of indicator variables 
Variable   Mean  Median  Stdev 
CEO indicatort Universe  0.17  0  0.38 
 Sample    0.17  0  0.38 
       
Female indicator  Universe  0.046  0  0.21 
 Sample    0.045  0  0.21 
       
CEO chair indicatort-1 Universe  0.66  1 0.47 
 Sample    0.68  1  0.47 
       
Dividend paying indicatort-1 Universe  0.59  1  0.49 
 Sample    0.59  1  0.49 
  37Table 3 
Determinants of the Level of Executive Compensation: Full Sample Regressions  
 
The table presents the regression results on the determinants of executive pay, using the full universe of 
ExecuComp companies. The dependent variable is log(total compensation). (1) is a pooled OLS regression 
without firm or manager fixed effects. (2) is the firm fixed effects regression, (3) is the manager fixed effects 
regression, and (4) is a spell fixed effects regression including both firm and manager fixed effects. The detailed 
definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics adjusting for 




(1) Pooled OLS 
(No firm or 
manager fixed 
effects) 





fixed effects (No 
firm fixed 
effects) 
(4) Firm and 
manager fixed 


























































































Female  -0.12*** 
(-5.70) 
-0.16*** 
(-11.66)  N.A. N.A. 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.49  0.66  0.76  0.77 
P-value for F test 
that all fixed 
effects = 0 
N.A. 0.00***  0.00***  0.00*** 
N 112,546  112,546  112,546  112,546 
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Table 4 
Determinants of the Level of Executive Compensation: Connectedness Sample 
Regressions and Relative Importance of Different Factors in Determining Compensation   
 
Panel A of the table presents the regression results on the determinants of executive pay, using the connectedness 
sample (i.e., the sample that includes all the managers who have worked in the companies that have hired at least 
one mover). The dependent variable is log(total compensation). (1) is a pooled OLS regression without firm or 
manager fixed effects. (2) is the firm fixed effects regression, (3) is the manager fixed effects regression, and (4) is 
a regression including both firm and manager fixed effects. In (4), we use the AKM method to separately identify 
manager and firm fixed effects. The detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. 
Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics adjusting for clustering within firms are in parentheses. Significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. Panel B of the table presents some statistics 
on the components that determine log(total compensation), using the estimation results from column (4) of Panel 
A. These components include observable time-variant firm characteristics ( γˆ W ), observable time-variant 
manager characteristics ( ), firm fixed effects ( β ˆ X ϕ ˆ ), manager fixed effects ( ), year effects ( θ ˆ μ ˆ ), and residuals 
(ε ˆ ). The table first reports the means and standard deviations of log( compensation) and the components, and 
then reports the covariance between log(compensation) and each of the components, normalized by the variance 
of log(total compensation). The normalized covariance (excluding residuals) can be interpreted as a 
decomposition of model R-squared and the covariance values correspond to the percentages (in parentheses) of 
the model R-squared attributable to particular factors.  
  39Panel A: Regression results using the connectedness sample  
 
(1) Pooled OLS 
(No firm or 
manager fixed 
effects) 





fixed effects (No 
firm fixed 
effects) 
(4) Firm and 
manager fixed 


























































































Female  -0.14*** 
(-5.10) 
-0.17*** 
(-9.09)  N.A. N.A. 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.49  0.64  0.73  0.75 
N 65,421  65,421  65,421  65,421 
 
Panel B: Relative importance of different components in determining compensation (using the AKM 
method to separately identify manager and firm fixed effects in the connectedness sample) 
 
  (1) Mean  (2) Stdev 
(3) 
)) var(log(
)   ), cov(log(
on compensati   total
component on compensati   total
 
 (Percentages of the model R-squared attributable to 
particular components are in parentheses) 
Log(total compensation)  7.08  1.07  -- 
Observable time-variant 
firm characteristics  1.96 0.38  0.20  (25%) 
Observable time-variant 
manager characteristics  0.16 0.13  0.04  (5%) 
Firm fixed effects  0.00  0.97  0.04 (5%) 
Manager fixed effects  0.00  1.12  0.44 (54%) 
Year effects  0.65  0.32  0.09 (11%) 
Residuals 0.00  0.47  0.19 
  40Table 5 
Robustness Tests 
   
The table presents the robustness test results on the determinants of executive pay. The dependent variable is 
log(total compensation). In Panels A and C, (1) is a pooled OLS regression without firm or manager fixed effects. 
(2) is the firm fixed effects regression, (3) is the manager fixed effects regression, and (4) is a regression including 
both firm and manager fixed effects. In (4), we use the MDV method to separately identify manager and firm 
fixed effects. Panel A presents the regression results using the mobility sample, which includes only the managers 
who have moved between firms. Panel B presents the relative importance of different factors in explaining 
compensation, using the estimation results from column (4) of Panel A. Panel C presents the regression results 
using the sample that includes only managers who have moved between firms with the change of total 
compensation within ±25% (i.e., a subsample where the firm-manager matching problem is arguably less likely). 
In this subsample, the mean (median) change in total compensation for managers is equal to 0.78% (1.1%). The 
relative importance of different factors in explaining compensation for this subsample is contained in Panel D. 
The details of definitions and measurements of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity 
robust t-statistics adjusting for clustering within firms are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
  41Panel A: Regression results using the mobility sample 
  (1) Pooled OLS   (2) Firm fixed 
effects 
(3) Manager 
fixed effects  
(4) Firm and 
manager fixed 






















































































Female  0.20 
(0.33) 
-0.20* 
(-3.72)  N.A. N.A. 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.46  0.63  0.65  0.71 
N  8,692  8,692  8,692  8,692     
 
Panel B: Relative importance of different components in determining compensation (using the MDV 
method to separately identify manager and firm fixed effects in the mobility sample) 
 
  )) var(log(
)   ), cov(log(
on compensati   total
component on compensati   total
 
(Percentages of the model R-squared attributable to particular 
components are in parentheses) 
Observable time-variant firm 
characteristics  0.23 (29%) 
Observable time-variant 
manager characteristics  0.03 (4%) 
Firm fixed effects  0.15 (19%) 
Manager fixed effects  0.31 (39%) 
Year effects  0.08 (10%) 
Residuals 0.20 
  42Panel C: Regression results using the sample that includes only managers who have moved between 
firms with a change of compensation within ±25%  
  (1) Pooled OLS  (2) Firm fixed 
effects 
(3) Manager 
fixed effects  
(4) Firm and 
manager fixed 






















































































Female  -0.03 
(-0.24) 
-0.02 
(-0.06)  N.A. N.A. 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.50  0.75  0.76  0.85 
N 1,296  1,296  1,296  1,296 
 
Panel D: Relative importance of different components in determining compensation (using the MDV 
method to separately identify manager and firm fixed effects in the sample that includes only managers 
who have moved between firms with a change of compensation within ±25%) 
 
  )) var(log(
)   ), cov(log(
on compensati   total
component on compensati   total
 
(Percentages of the model R-squared attributable to particular 
components are in parentheses) 
Observable time-variant firm 
characteristics  0.09 (11%) 
Observable time-variant 
manager characteristics  0.03 (4%) 
Firm fixed effects  0.03 (4%) 
Manager fixed effects  0.58 (68%) 
Year effects  0.12 (14%) 
Residuals 0.15 
  43Table 6 
Manager Fixed Effects and Observable Managerial Characteristics 
 
The table presents the frequency distribution of the highest degrees received by CEOs in S&P500 companies 
during the period from 1992 to 2008 (Panel A), and the results from regressing manager compensation fixed 
effects on observable time-invariant managerial characteristics (Panel B). Education1 is equal to 1 for below 
bachelor, 2 for bachelors, 3 for non-MBA masters and MBAs, and 4 for doctorates. Education2 is the number of 
years of education, with below bachelor being 12 years, bachelor 16 years, non-MBA masters and MBAs, 18 
years, and Ph.D. 21 years. The missing degree information is imputed using the mean values of Education1 and 
Education2, 2.74 and 17.6. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Frequency distribution of CEOs’ highest degree 
Education (highest degree)  Frequency  Percent  Cumulative 
Below bachelor   15  1.97  1.97 
Bachelor 243  31.85  33.82 
Non-MBA masters  80  10.48  44.30 
MBA 225  29.49  73.79 
Ph.D. 102  13.37  87.16 
Missing degree information  98  12.84  100.00 
Total 763  100.00  -- 
 
Panel B: Results of regressing manager compensation fixed effects on CEO personal characteristics 
Dependent variable = manager compensation fixed effects 
estimated with AKM approach on connectedness sample  (1)   (2)  
Education1  0.14*** 
(2.63)  -- 
Education2 --  0.06*** 
(2.75) 
















R-squared 0.01  0.01 
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Relation between Managerial Fixed Compensation Effects and Fixed Policy Effects 
 
The table presents the relation between manager compensation fixed effects and manager “style” fixed effects in 
various corporate policies. We perform regression FE(comp)i = α + β×FE(z)i + εi, where j indexes managers, 
FE(comp) represents manager fixed effects in compensation, and FE(z) represents manager fixed effects in a 
particular corporate policy variable, z. We then report the β estimates in the table, with each entry corresponding 
to a regression associated with one particular policy. In Column (1), fixed compensation and policy effects are 
estimated using the AKM method, and in Column (2), the MDV method. Column (3) reports the economic 
magnitude (in dollar amounts) of the Column (1) estimates. Multiplying the standard deviation of each policy 
variable by its corresponding β estimate in (1) gives the change in compensation fixed effects for a one standard 
deviation change in policy fixed effects. Based on the change in compensation fixed effects, we calculate the 
change in log(compensation) (i.e., log(pay2)-log(pay1)) for an executive with average pay (i.e., pay1 = sample 
average $2,218 thousand), holding other variables constant. We then calculate the pay change (pay2-pay1) in 
dollar amounts and report it in Column (3). That is, the numbers in Column (3) can be interpreted as the executive 
pay change given a one standard deviation change in policy fixed effects (for the dividend indicator, it is the pay 
difference between dividend-paying companies and non-dividend-paying companies). The details of the 
definitions and the measurements of these variables are reported in Appendix A. Heteroscedasticity robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 
Coefficient estimates of regressing compensation fixed effects on policy fixed effects 
 
(1) Manager fixed effects 
estimated using the AKM 
approach 
(2) Manager fixed 
effects estimated using 
the MDV approach 
(3) Change in pay based 
on the estimates in (1) 
($thousand) 
R&D  1.51*** 
(9.15) 
0.94 
(1.53)  180 
Investment  0.41*** 
(10.65) 
0.25* 
(1.77)  258 
Leverage  0.17** 
(2.49) 
0.15 
(0.58)  57 
Cash holdings  -0.09*** 
(-3.05) 
0.06 






(1.90)  659 
Dividend yield  1.66*** 
(3.61) 
1.47 
(0.84)  96 
 
 
  45Figure 1 
Distribution of Estimated Manager Fixed Effects 
 
The figure presents the distribution of estimated manager fixed effects, using histograms and the kernel density 
estimation (curved line). Manager fixed effects are estimated using the AKM method in the connectedness sample 
(i.e., regression (4) of Table 4, Panel A). Because fixed effects are estimated relative to a benchmark, the mean 
and the location of the estimated fixed effects may change when different benchmarks are used. However, the 
shape of the distribution function and the standard deviation of fixed effects do not depend on benchmarks. In the 
graph, we normalize the fixed effects so that the mean value of the manager fixed effects is zero. 
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  46Appendix A: Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Names  Variable Definitions and Corresponding Compustat and ExecuComp Data 
Items 
Firm level variables 
Log(assets)  Natural log of total assets = log(data6). Assets are measured in $millions. 
Market to book    (Market value of equity plus the book value of debt)/total assets = 
( data25*data199+data6-data60)/data6. 
 
Tangibility  Net property, plant and equipment/total assets = data8/data6. 
Stock return  Annual stock returns from CRSP.  
Return on assets (ROA)  Net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by 
total assets = data18/lag(data6). 
 
Return on equity (ROE)  Net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by 
the total book value of common equity = data18/data60.  
 
Stock return volatility  Standard deviation of daily log returns over the past five years and then 
annualized by multiplying by the square root of 254. 
 
CEO chair indicator  A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO of the company is also the board 
chairman, and zero otherwise. 
 
Leverage  (Long term debt + debt in current liabilities)/total assets = (data9+data34)/data6. 
 
Dividend paying indicator  A dummy variable equal to one if data21, common dividends, is positive, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
R&D  Research and development expense/lag one year net property, plant, and 
equipment = data46/lag(data8). 
 





Capital expenditures/lag one year net property, plant, and equipment = 
data128/lag(data8). 
 
Cash holdings  Cash and short-term investments/(total assets – cash and short-term investments) 
= data1/(data6-data1). 
 
Dividend yield  Dividends per share divided by year-end stock price = data26/data24. 
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Manager level variables 
Log(total compensation)  Natural log of total compensation, where total compensation is ExecuComp data 
item TDC1 and is comprised of salary, bonus, other annual, total value of 
restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-
Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total. Total compensation is 
measured in $thousands. 
 
Log(salary plus bonus)  Natural log of salary plus bonus, where salary plus bonus is ExecuComp data 




Natural log of total equity-based compensation, where equity-based 
compensation is equal to the value of options granted as valued using the Black 
Scholes methodology (OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE) plus the value of 
restricted stock grants (RSTKGRNT). Equity-based compensation is measured 
in $thousands. 
 
Log(tenure)  Natural log of the number of years the manager has been with the company, 
which equals the difference between the year of the observation and the year 
when the individual joined the company.   
 
CEO indicator  A dummy variable that equals one if the manager is the CEO in a particular year 
and zero if the manager is a non-CEO top executive in a particular year. This 
dummy variable is time variant for a given individual because a specific manager 
could be a CEO in some years and a non CEO in other years. 
 




 Appendix B: Detailed Discussion of the Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (AKM) Method 
 
This appendix is intended to be read jointly with “Managerial Attributes and Executive 
Compensation” and contains a detailed methodological and econometric discussion.  
 
B.1 The Estimation Procedure of the AKM Method 
We first start with a discussion on how to use the AKM method to obtain model 
estimates in the three-way fixed effects model (i.e., Equation (4) in the text):  
Ln(yit)= Xit β + Wjt γ +  φj + θi + μt + εit ,                      (A1) 
where Wjt and Xit represent observable firm and manager characteristics, φj, θi, and μt denote 
firm, manager, and year fixed effects in compensation, and εit is the residual. 
Including dummy variables for each manager and each firm and then estimating 
Equation (A1) using the standard least square dummy variable (LSDV) approach (as one does 
in the Mover Dummy Variable (MDV) method) is often computationally infeasible in the 
connectedness sample, because a large number of dummy variables associated with firms and 
managers require substantive computer memory.
27 In a standard two-way fixed effects model 
which includes firm fixed effects and time fixed effects, this problem is circumvented by using 
the within transformation to sweep out the heterogeneity. That is, for each cross-section, first 
average the two-way fixed effects equation over time to get a mean equation, and then subtract 
                                                 
27 Using the standard dummy variable approach to estimate the model becomes computationally infeasible in very 
large datasets. To quantify this, let N be the number of observations, I the number of persons, J the number of 
firms, and K the number of regressors. As in Andrews et al. (2006) and Cornelissen (2008), assume that the 
storage of each matrix element requires 4 bytes. The total memory required in the MDV method is roughly 
N×(I+J+K-1)×4 + (I+J+K-1)
2×4. The total memory required in the AKM method is equal to N×(J+K-1)×4 + 
(J+K-1)
2×4, independent of the number of persons. Cornelissen (2008) further develops a memory saving Stata 
algorithm to reduce the memory used in the AKM method to (J+K-1)
2×4, which is independent of not only the 
number of persons but also the number of observations. In this paper, using AKM, we have N=65,421, I=15,352, 
J=1,272, and K=26 (including 16 year indicators), and the required memory is about 346MB (and only 6.7MB 
when using the memory saving algorithm). If the MDV approach is applied to the same dataset, the required 
memory is 5.5GB, which is intensive in most personal computers.  
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Because firm fixed effects are constant within each cross-section, this transformation 
effectively sweeps out firm fixed effects.  
In the three-way fixed effects model, because the correspondence between firms and 
managers is unpatterned, no transformation can simultaneously sweep out both firm and 
manager fixed effects. To solve the problem, the AKM method first sweeps out manager fixed 
effects using the within-person transformation, but keeps time and firm fixed effects, and then 
uses the LSDV approach to estimate variable coefficients and firm and year fixed effects. 
Abowd et al. (1999) note that this method results in the same solution presented in the full 
LSDV method. Specifically, let Yit = Ln(yit) to simplify the notation and write out the firm 
dummy variable: Fjit, which equals one if manager i works in firm j at time t, and zero 
otherwise. Equation (A1) can thus be rewritten as  
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Average Equation (A1) over t = 1, 2, …, T to get the cross section equation  
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Subtracting (A2) from (A1) gives the time demeaned equation 
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Manager fixed effects θi are thus swept out and Equation (A4) can be estimated using the 
LSDV method. Based on Andrews et al. (2006), Hsiao (2002), and Wooldridge (2001), the 
manager fixed effects can later be recovered using the following equation (μ , often treated as 
the benchmark in estimating time effects, is assumed to be zero): 




− − − =
J
j
ji i i i F W X Y ϕ γ β θ .                     (A5)   
Interested readers can follow the above steps to apply the AKM method.
28 Intuitively, 
using the pay differential of a manager who has worked in different companies, we can 
determine the fixed effects for all the firms at which he or she has been employed (with one 
firm fixed effect being the benchmark). Once the firm fixed effects are identified, the personal 
fixed effects can be determined by subtracting the observable determinants and firm fixed 
effects from the pay earned by the manager. 
 
B.2 The Econometric Properties of the Spell, MDV, and AKM Estimates 
In addition to the AKM method, the paper shows that we can estimate Equation (A1) 
using the more traditional spell fixed effects and the MDV methods. Here we discuss the 
econometric properties of the model estimates using the three methods. 
Recall that the spell method rewrites Equation (A1) as Ln(yit)= Xit β + Wjt γ + Vs+ μt + 
εit, where Vs, equal to φj + θi, is a dummy variable representing each unique combination of 
manager i and firm j. According to Abowd et al. (1999) and Wooldridge (2001), the estimates 
of β and γ from the spell method are consistent and unbiased if the error term is uncorrelated 
with all the right-hand-side variables (formally, E(εit|Xit, Wjt, Vs,, μt)=0). The spell estimator is 
also efficient when the random error ε is homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated. 
As with the spell estimator, the parameter estimates from the MDV method are 
consistent and unbiased under the standard econometric assumption of E(εit|Xit, Wjt, θi, φj, μt)=0, 
and  efficient with homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated random errors. The estimates of the 
                                                 
28 For more information, refer to Abowd et al. (1999) and Abowd et al. (2002) for detailed discussions on the 
estimation method, and to Andrew et al. (2007) and Cornelissen (2008) for the algorithm developed using Stata. 
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estimators. However, as Hsiao (2002) and Wooldridge (2001) note, the estimates of the fixed 
effects are not consistent. The main intuition as follows: each time a new cross-section of 
observations is added, another fixed effect (φj  or  θi) is added, and information does not 
accumulate fast enough on the fixed effects when the number of cross sections goes to infinity. 
Although Hsiao (2002) notes that the estimates of fixed effects are consistent if and only if the 
number of time periods goes to infinity, this condition is rarely satisfied because, in panel data, 
the number of time periods is usually limited. 
The econometric properties of the AKM estimates of β and γ are the same as the spell 
and the MDV methods. The properties of the estimates of the fixed effects θi and φj are the 
same as those of the MDV method, that is, unbiased and efficient but inconsistent. Also, as 
discussed in Section 2.2.3 of the paper, both the MDV and the AKM methods are subject to a 
potential limited mobility bias. 
Our estimation results find that manager fixed effects estimated from the AKM and the 
MDV methods are close, with a correlation of 0.77 (Appendix B Table A1) and similar 
distributions (Appendix B Figure A1). We then discuss two additional econometric properties 
of the AKM method, in the context of comparing AKM with MDV. First, the β and γ estimates 
are more precise using the AKM method due to the larger connectedness sample (relative to 
the smaller mobility sample used in the MDV method). In our application using ExecuComp 
data, the mobility sample includes 8,692 observations, 1,256 managers, and 1,272 firms, while 
the connectedness sample includes 65,421 observations, 15,352 managers, and 1,272 firms. 
Through group connection, the AKM approach increases the sample size about tenfold, and the 
resulting coefficient estimates are more precise because standard errors are proportional to 
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0.5, where N is the sample size. For example, the standard errors of the AKM estimates 
(Table 4 of the main paper) are about 1/3 of those of the MDV estimates (Table 5).
29 
 Second, using the AKM method, the model explanatory power attributable to firm and 
manager fixed effects is 5% and 54% (Table 4, Panel B), while the shares are 19% and 39% 
using the MDV method (Table 5, Panel B). The differences in the percentages between the two 
methods are the result of sample difference and normalization procedure, as described next.  
If we apply the AKM method to the mobility sample, firm and manager fixed effects 
respectively explain 11% and 45% of the model R-squared. The improvement (from 5% to 
11%) of the relative importance of firm fixed effects is due to the fact that the mobility sample 
includes only movers while the connectedness sample includes movers and non-movers. For 
each individual mover manager, firm fixed effects contribute to his or her pay variation 
because the manager switches between companies that often have different firm fixed effects. 
In contrast, for the non-mover managers in the same company, firm fixed effects do not 
contribute to the pay variation between these managers because they have the same firm fixed 
effects. Firm fixed effects contribute to the pay variation of the non-mover managers who 
belong to different firms. That is, firm fixed effects contribute to the between-firm (but not 
within-firm) pay variation, and possibly play a more important role in explaining compensation 
for mover managers than for non-mover managers. This indicates that in a sample with a larger 
proportion of movers (such as the mobility sample), firm fixed effects may play a more 
significant role in explaining compensation.  
                                                 
29 Note that the increased precision applies to the coefficient estimates (β and γ) of the observable explanatory 
variables in the model, and may not apply to the estimates of the fixed effects. For the estimates of the fixed 
effects, the caveat is that while the extra observations add power, it is still the case that identifying the non-mover 
fixed effects ultimately hinges on the movers, who only make up a small proportion of our sample. 
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same as those attained from the MDV method (Table 5, Panel B) (11% and 45% vs. 19% and 
39%). The remaining discrepancy is due to the AKM normalization procedure. The AKM 
method normalizes the fixed effects so that they are comparable across different groups (details 
in Appendix B.3). In contrast, the MDV method does not normalize the fixed effects. When we 
normalize the MDV fixed effects using the AKM normalization procedure, the firm and 
manager fixed effects respectively contribute 11% and 45% of the R-squared, identical to the 
results from applying the AKM method to the mobility sample.      
 
B.3 The AKM Normalization Procedure 
A practical estimation issue in the AKM method is normalization. Abowd et al. (1999) 
show that within each group, all person and firm effects are identified up to a scale. 
Specifically, suppose there are J firms and I managers in one group. Then J+I-1 firm and 
manager effects will be identified in this group because one firm or manager effect must be 
taken as the benchmark: the other J+I-1 fixed effects are expressed as differences from the 
reference fixed effect in the group. Overall, exactly M + N − G total person and firm effects are 
identified, where M, N, and G are the total number of persons, firms, and groups in the sample. 
Because manager and firm fixed effects are identified relative to a benchmark within 
each group, and each group has its own benchmark, the estimated firm and manager effects are 
directly comparable only within the same group, not across groups. We follow the 
normalization procedure suggested by Cornelissen (2008) to ensure that the fixed effects across 
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30 This procedure first normalizes the mean firm fixed effects for each 
group to zero and adds the group mean firm fixed effect to manager fixed effects (to ensure 
that Equation (A1) holds). The procedure then subtracts the grand mean of manager fixed 
effects from each manager fixed effect and adds this grand mean manager fixed effect to the 
intercept.  
Although the normalization procedure provides one way to make fixed effects 
“comparable” across groups, it could change the relative explanatory power of firm and 
manager fixed effects. Because different groups have different benchmarks (which are mean 
firm fixed effects for each group, as discussed above), normalization will affect the relative 
location and variation of the fixed effects across groups. That is, the between-group 
explanatory power will be re-weighted between firm and manager fixed effects after 
normalization. Within a group, the fixed effects have one common benchmark and 
normalization will not change the relative location or variation of fixed effects and thus should 
not affect the explanatory power of firm and manager fixed effects.  
To check the robustness of our results with respect to the normalization procedure, we 
re-estimate all our regressions using only the largest group (so normalization is not necessary), 
which is composed of around 65% of the connectedness sample; we find similar qualitative 
results (available upon request). We also re-examine the relative importance of different factors 
in determining compensation using only the largest group in the sample. The AKM results 
from the largest group in the connectedness sample show that firm and manager fixed effects 
contribute 3% and 56% of the R-squared (Column 1 of Appendix B Table A2). The MDV 
results from the largest group (70% of the full mobility sample) in the mobility sample show 
                                                 
30 In contrast, the MDV method does not normalize the fixed effects and each group has its own benchmark (and 
these benchmarks are typically the dummy variables automatically dropped by statistical software). As a result, 
the MDV fixed effects are not comparable across groups. 
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Appendix B Table A2). As in the main text, these results consistently suggest that manager 
fixed effects play a more significant role in explaining executive compensation than do firm 
fixed effects.  
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Statistics on Manager Fixed Effects Estimated Using the AKM and MDV Methods 
 
The table presents the statistics on manager fixed effects estimated using the AKM and MDV methods. Because 
the MDV method is only applied to movers and the AKM method can be applied in a larger sample, to ensure that 
the analyses in the table are implementable and the statistics comparable, we base the analyses on movers only. 
That is, we obtain the manager fixed effects using the two methods, match their fixed effects by executive ids, and 
then keep only movers’ fixed effects in the analysis. Because fixed effects are estimated relative to a benchmark, 
the mean and the location of the estimated fixed effects may change when different benchmarks are used. The 
shape of the distribution function, the standard deviation, and the correlations of fixed effects, however, do not 
depend on benchmarks. In Panel A, we normalize the fixed effects so that the mean value of the manager fixed 
effects is zero. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of the manager fixed effects estimated using the AKM and MDV methods 
Variable  name  Mean  Stdev  P10  P25 P50 P75 P90 
Manager fixed effects estimated 
using the AKM method  0.00 1.02  -1.19  -0.58  -0.001  0.66 1.26 
Manager fixed effects estimated 
using the MDV method  0.00 1.21  -1.49  -0.72 0.01 0.78 1.43 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation between the manager fixed effects estimated using the AKM and MDV methods 
Correlation  Manager fixed effects estimated using the MDV 
method 
Manager fixed effects estimated using the AKM 
method  0.77*** 
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Relative Importance of Different Components in Determining Compensation (Based on 
the Largest Group) 
 
The table presents the relative importance of different factors in explaining compensation, using the estimation 
results from the largest groups in the data samples. Column (1) presents the AKM results from the largest group 
(65% of the full connectedness sample) in the connectedness sample and Column (2) presents the MDV results 
from the largest group (70% of the full mobility sample) in the mobility sample. Detailed information on how to 
estimate the relative importance is contained in Table 4 of the paper.  
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(Percentages of the model R-squared attributable to particular 
components are in parentheses) 
  (1) Largest group in the 
connectedness sample 
(2) Largest group in the 
mobility sample 
Observable time-variant firm characteristics  0.20 (25%)  0.23(29%) 
Observable time-variant manager characteristics  0.04 (5%)  0.03(4%) 
Firm fixed effects  0.02 (3%)  0.08(10%) 
Manager fixed effects  0.45 (56%)  0.37(47%) 
Year effects  0.09 (11%)  0.08 (10%) 
Residuals 0.20  0.21 
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Distribution of Estimated Manager Fixed Effects 
 
The figure presents the distribution of estimated manager fixed effects, using histograms and kernel density 
estimation (curved line). Manager fixed effects are estimated using the MDV method in the mobility sample (i.e., 
regression (4) of Table 5, Panel A). Because fixed effects are estimated relative to a benchmark, the mean and 
location of the estimated fixed effects may change when different benchmarks are used. However, the shape of the 
distribution function and the standard deviation of fixed effects do not depend on benchmarks. In the graph, we 
normalize the fixed effects so that the mean value of the manager fixed effects is zero. 
 




















-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Manager Fixed Effects
Distribution of Estimated Manager Fixed Effects
 
 
 
 
  59